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CASE NO. 9707 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
VERN C. STRAND and 
ELEANOR A. STRAND 
vs. 
FRED MAYNE and 
DETT A ANN MAYNE 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action brought by vendees under a uni-
form real estate contract by which they purchased a 
dilapidated commercial motel property (contrary to ex-
pert advice not to do so) for the purpose of making 
''extra money," made repairs and put a false front on it, 
sold it for a substantial profit, lost it through misman-
agement and neglect, and by this action seek to recover 
their alleged losses from the vendors. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
From a judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' com-
plaint with prejudice upon motion of the defendants for 
summary judgment, the plaintiffs appeal. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs-Appellants seek reversal of the judgment 
and permission to go to trial upon the merits. Defendants-
Respondents seek affirmation of the summary judgment 
granted by the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts as they appear from the pleadings and 
from the deposition of the appellant, Vern C. Strand, 
and from the appellants' answers to the respondents' in-
terrogatories on file herein, are stated at some length to 
save the Court the time and trouble of ferreting them out, 
as follows: 
On or about April1, 1955, appellants purchased from 
respondents the motel and premises described in that 
Uniform Real Estate Contract attached to appellants' 
complaint ( R. 5) and referred to therein as Exhibit "A", 
consisting of 17 units and a house and a new, uncom-
pleted vacant building <Dep .. p. 37) for the sum of 
$41,500.00, payable $7,578.58 down (the agreed value of 
contracts assigned and transferred to the respondents by 
the appellants) and the balance payable according to the 
terms of that contract, pursuant to which appellants took 
possession of the premises and operated them through 
a hired manager, who lived in the house on the premises 
<Dep. p. 37), for a period of approximately two years 
<Dep. p. 27) until they sold it to F. C. Watterson and 
Mae Watterson by Uniform Real Estate Contract dated 
March 20, 1957, attached to respondents' amended ans-
wer and counterclaim <R. 22) and referred to therein ~ 
"Exhibit I," for the sum of $63,000.00, at a profit of 
$21,500.00, on which sale they received as a down pay-
ment the sum of $500.00 cash plus an equity in a cafe 
in Nephi of the acknowledged value of $12,662.00, or a 
total down payment of $13,162.00. 
The premises were observed by appellants to be in 
f) 
..... 
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a run-down condition at the time appellants purchased 
them from respondents (Dep. pp. 12, 13, 14, IS, 16, 17, 
19, 20, 21, 22, 24); all of the units were not occupied 
<Dep. pp. 22, 23); two new units were unfinished (Dep. 
p. 23); respondent Mayne recommended that the new 
units be completed into a double unit, (Dep. p. 24) and 
so did appellant's wife, <Dep. p. 25), but appellant Strand 
made it into a cafe which appellants "rented" at first 
and then "leased" <Dep. p. 25); the units were not the 
over-night type for transients but were occupied for the 
most part by permanent residents, one tenant having 
been there for seven years (Dep. p. 23); the repairs made 
by appellants did not appreciably increase the rental in-
come (Appellants' answer 91 to the respondents' inter-
rogatory 91, RSO); appellants kept the rates "pretty much 
the same" as they were before ( Dep. p. 26). 
Before appellants made the purchase, appellant 
Strand brought one Beth Roberts, a successful motel 
operator in Salt Lake City and Las Vegas, Nevada, (Dep. 
p. 35) to look at the premises and advise with him about 
it, (Dep. p. 12); was told he was going to have to put a 
lot of money and time and a lot of work "to put them in 
shape to rent out" <Dep. pp. 12, 13, 23, 24); but ap-
pellants did not take the counsel and advice of their 
experienced and "competent" adviser (Dep. pp. 13, 35); 
appellant Strand admitted that "she was sure right" and 
that he "should have listened to her" <Dep. p. 24), and 
admitted that afterwards she (Beth Roberts) said "I told 
you so." <Dep. p. 35). Appellant Strand said it was the 
"biggest mistake" of his life ( Dep. p. 20), said he didn't 
think he needed a builder to check it for him and that 
that was his fault and his wife's <Dep. pp. 18, 64), said 
he would have been a lot better off if he had not sold 
to Wattersons <Dep. p. 31), admitted he "could have 
made the payments" if he had not sold to W attersons 
<Dep. p. 31), admitted that he could have "paid the 
property out" if he had not sold to Wattersons <Dep. 
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p. 31), admitted that if the W attersons had "been good 
purchasers and had paid out" appellants would have 
made a "nice profit" <Dep. p. 34), and "could have got" 
his "money out of it" and "wouldn't have lost anything" 
(Dep. p. 34) and would have "got rid of one more head-
ache, the trouble of going out there every night." (Dep. 
p. 34). 
Appellants stated that they believed the premises 
had a value of $35,000.00 at the time they purchased 
them and had a value of $63,000.00 at the time they sold 
them. (Appellants' answer 85 to respondents' interroga-
tory 85, R. 50). At the bottom of page 32 and top of page 
33 of appellant Strand's deposition, he states that the 
repairs and improvements placed upon the premises, as 
alleged in- paragraph 4 of his complaint, increased the 
market value of the premises by $25,000.00, although he 
did not have any appraisal made (Dep. pp. 33, 34), say-
ing "that was just a figure that I figured", merely his own 
"personal estimate" ·(Dep. p. 33). The cost of $41,500.00 
and the alleged increase of $25,000.00 would equal 
$66,500.00. Appellant Strand tried to sell the premises to 
W attersons for $75,000.00, but finally took ·w attersons' 
offer of $63,000.00, because of the fact that appellant 
was· tired of "going out there and back every dog-goned 
night" and because his "wife was hollering about it." 
. (Dep. p. 33). The inflated sale price realized by appellants 
on their sale to the W attersons was not the true value of 
the premises. Competent appraisers fixed the value at 
$35,000.00 when they appraised the premises on April 
18, 1962, (See Affidavit attached to Respondents' Brief 
in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 
97) which corresponded to what appellant Strand said 
it was worth when he bought it. 
W attersons sold the premises to "some people by 
the name of Goldsby" (Dep. p. 44); Goldsbys got a divorce 
and appellants couldn't find anyone to "collect the money 
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
from" ( Dep. p. 29); Goldsbys had a partner named 
Clinger who at one time was "making a deal with a 
Verda Lind." <Dep. p. 45). 
It does not appear from appellant Strand's deposi-
tion (or elsewhere in the record) what the terms of the 
subsequent sales were. However, it is clear from the 
deposition that appellants or their counsel would furn-
ish respondents with "the total amount of all the rents 
received" by appellants while they were in possession and 
"all the payments" received "from the people to whom" 
the premises were sold. <Dep. p. 65; also pp. 66 and 67.) 
This they did not do. 
Appellants said they were unable to account for any 
sums which may have passed hands on the subsequent 
sales of the premises, (Appellants' answers 9 and 10 to 
respondents' interrogatories 9 and 10, R. 47) and were 
unable to account for any income or disposition of in-
come or furnish any information concerning the operation 
of the motel units or cafe from and after the time ap-
pellants sold to Wattersons. <See appellants' answers to 
respondents' interrogatories 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 
25, 26, 27, 33, 34, 35, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 49, 50 and 51, 
R. 47, 48, 49. > 
Appellants' first default under their contract with 
respondents was in the fall of 1955 when they failed to 
pay the taxes and the respondents applied the monthly 
payment on the taxes <Dep. pp. 38, 39). With that ex-
ception, although they were "late on several occasions", 
appellants evidently never missed a payment until after 
they sold to the W attersons <Dep. p. 39). There were 
numerous defaults on the part of appellants in the terms 
of their contract of purchase from respondents after ap-
pellants sold to Wattersons <Dep. pp. 30, 31, 38, 39, 41, 
42, 43), and appellants were getting demands from 
the Bank which held the escrow agreement ( Dep. p. 38). 
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Respondents gave them additional time to make pay-
ments and to pay the taxes (Dep. pp. 40, 41, 42). 
Appellants never did notify respondents that they 
had sold to W attersons, nor did respondents have any 
notice of any of the subsequent sales beyond the W atter-
sons. "Nobody notified anybody," admitted appellant 
Strand. Appellants recognized their responsibility to see 
that respondents got paid so they (appellants) would not 
lose the premises, and appellant Strand went to Clinger 
and told him he had "to pay" or he (appellant) would 
take the loss, and three days later called Clinger and 
"really bawled him out." (Dep. p. 48). 
Clinger had evidently been appellants' real estate 
agent. Appellant Strand said: "He was the one that sold 
it to the W attersons from me, but someway he came back 
into the pictu,re and when I went out to try and get some 
money from Goldsby she told me to collect from Clinger. 
I was supposed to collect from him. And he is the guy I 
started hounding." (Dep. p. 30).- By the time appellants 
had sold to W ?ttersons, they were at least $2,000.00 in 
default to respondents <Dep. p. 43) .-
. Appellants were only required to pay respondents 
$375.00 per month·, besides the two $1,000.00 payments 
due July 1, 1956, and July 1, 1957. (See Contract marked 
Exhibit "A'' attached to appellants' complaint, R. 5). But 
their contract of sale to W attersons required W attersons 
to pay them $600.00 per month for the months from 
April through September, and $375.00 per month for the 
months October through March, and in addition 
$1,000.00 on August 1, 1957. <See contract marked "Ex-
hibit l" attached to respondents' amended answer and 
counterclaim, R. 22). Appellants collected at least some 
of the larger $600.00 payments from Wattersons (Dep. 
pp. 44, 45). In August appellants learned that W attersons 
had sold to Goldsbys, and informed them of the delin-
quent payments (Oep. p. 44). CTOldsby said Clinger was 
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to make the payments, and appellants went to Clinger 
and got $500.00,~ (Dep. pp. 45, 46) and a promise of 
more later <Dep. p. 46). When appellant Strand called 
Clinger later, he was told that Verda Lind had bought 
the place from Goldsbys; that Goldsbys were getting a 
divorce; that they had the place "tied up in court and 
didn't know who was 'going to get the Motel'". Appellant 
admitted saying to Clinger: "Yes, and in the meantime I 
am in a bad spot here because I will be losing the place 
and I am going to get some money to pay," adding: "I 
can't wait while they are fighting in court and every-
thing." (Dep. p. 46). When Verda Lind backed out later, 
Clinger told appellants they had nothing to worry about, 
that he (Clinger) was "going to take it and see that" 
appellants got "taken care of". (Dep. p. 48). Appellant 
Strand quoted Clinger further as saying: "The thing is 
I sold the place to Verda Lind and I can go up and pay 
off all these payments and put us both in good shape." 
<Dep. p. 50). 
Appellant Strand stated that if the W attersons had 
paid him in accordance with their agreement, or had the 
Goldsbys paid in accordance with their agreement, or 
had Clinger or Verda Lind paid, he would have turned 
that money in on his contract and paid the escrow out 
"as fast as possible." ( Dep. p. 50). 
Appellant Strand admitted that he was in arrears 
at least $1,000.00 plus two monthly payments ($375.00 
each) when he got a letter from the Bank saying if he 
could catch up by December, 1957, it would be all right; 
then said he was given until January, 1958. <Dep. p. 52). 
But appellants' complaint alleges that the last payment 
was made by appellants on October 3rd, 1957. There is 
nothing in the record to indicate that appellants ever 
made tender or attempted to renegotiate the contract, or 
to refinance or dispose of the property. On January 8, 
1958, the escrow holder (Bank) returned the escrow 
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papers to respondents. <Dep. p. 58). 
As a result of the successive defaults, of non-pay-
ments, late payments and failure to pay taxes, respond-
ents were compelled to and did, after legal notice, com-
mence a civil action for repossession of the premises, on 
or about January 13th, 1958, in the Weber County Dis-
tict Court (Civil action No. 33330, Department No. 2) 
against the persons then in possession, namely: one Lucy 
Semora and one Verda Lynn (Lind). The premises 
were restored to respondents by the judgment and decree 
of the Weber County District Court on February lOth, 
1958. 
Thereafter on May 13, 1958, the present action was 
commenced by appellants against respondents. 
The complaint <R. 1) contains two causes of ac-
tion: ( 1 ) the first alleging that plaintiffs-appellants had 
paid and expended a total of $29,020.95, and sought to 
have the Court award to them an equitable portion of 
that sum on the theory of unjust enrichment; and (2) 
the second alleging misrepresentations on the part of the 
defendants-respondents as an inducement to persuade 
appellants to enter into the contract, claiming damages 
of $29,020.95. 
The amended answer and counterclaim <R. 15) of 
the defendants denies generally the allegations of the 
complaint and sets up affirmative defenses thereto. 
Respondents affirmative defenses and denial of both un-
just enrichment and fraud formed the basis for respond-
ents motion ·for summary judgment. The fourth defense 
alleges that plaintiffs carefully inspected the premises 
prior to purchase, sought independent counsel and a.d-
vice did not take the advice received, were not mts-
info~med or misled by defendants, made their own de-
cision to purchase, and were bound by their co~tr~ct 
under which they agreed to accept the property 1n Its 
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then condition and agreed that no representations were 
made other than those set forth in the con tract itself. 
The fifth defense denied fraud and alleges that plaintiffs-
appellants elected to remain in possession after their al-
leged discovery and made repairs and did not elect to res-
cind or repudiate the contract or demand the return of 
their down payment, and having so elected were estopped 
to do so. The sixth defense alleges that plaintiffs-appel-
lants not only made the elections referred to in the fifth 
defense, but made the further election to sell the premises 
to the W attersons for a profit and were estopped to make 
any claim against the defendants-respondents. The 
seventh defense alleges that plaintiffs-appellants repeat-
edly defaulted under their contract of purchase, and sold 
to others, and continued to default, and were in default 
when the premises were returned by decree in Civil 
action No. 33330 of the Weber County District Court, 
Department No.2, on February lOth, 1958. The counter-
claim is not an issue on this appeal. 
A summary and brief a:oalysis of the figures stated 
in the appellants' pleadings, answers to interrogatories, 
deposition and admissions, disclose that appellants op-
erated their business venture entirely on respondents' 
money and property and their (appellants') profit on the 
re-sale of the property to the W attersons, or had op-
portunity to do so but for their own mismanagement and 
neglect: 
Appellants' complaint alleges: 
Down payment to respondents of ________ $ 7,578.58 
Monthly payments to respondents of ____ 10,875.00 
Claimed repairs, improvements, 
additions and equipment of -------------- 9,567.37 
Bonus payment to respondents of ________ 1,000.00 
Total $29,020.95 
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Appellants' complaint also alleges that the property 
had a reasonable rental value of $450.00 per month. 
Respondents' position is that Appellants operated 
on Respondents' money and property, and on their profit 
from their sale to W attersons, and but for their own 
mis-management, etc., had none of their own money in 
the venture: 
Appellants bought premises for ____________ $41,500.00 
and sold them to W attersons for ________ 63,000.00 
thereby making a profit of -------------------- 21,500.00 
Appellants received on that resale 
cash of $500.00 and an equity in 
a cafe in Nephi (still being opera-
ted by appellants, Dep. p. 10) of 
the agreed value of $12,662.00, or 
a down payment from Wattersons of $13,162.00 
<In addition, appellants acquired 
a claim against W attersons of 
$8,338.00 for loss of an advan-
tageous bargain when W atter-
sons defaulted, being the differ-
ence between their profit of $21, 
500.00 arid the down payment of 
$13,162.00). 
Appellants collected rents in excess 
of their alleged reasonable rental 
value of the premises ($450.00 
per month), or could or should 
have done so, which, calculated 
on the minimum basis of their 
own valuation of $450.00 per 
month for 33 months, amounts to 
the minimum sutn of ________________________ $14,850.00 
Total money not appellants own .... $28,012.00 
10 
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In addition appellants had the use 
of respondents' property, for 
which their contract called for 
interest at 5.5%. Deducting ap-
pellants' alleged down payment 
of $7,578.58 and their alleged 
monthly payments of $10,875.00 
($18,453.58) from the purchase 
price of $41,500.00, would give 
the minimum constant unpaid 
principal balance of . $23,046.42, 
\vhich at 5.5% interest per an-
num, unpaid, amounts to the fur-
ther asset use value of ________________________ $ 3,485.68 
Total money, property and in-
terest not their own, avail-
able to and used by_ appellants __ $31,497.68 
From this it is apparent that if the appellants have 
lost any money whatever they have no one to blame but 
themselves. Appellants have failed to furnish evidence 
of their collections or the collections of their transferees 
and successor transferees or evidence of the consideration 
passing between the W attersons and the successor trans-
ferees from the Wattersons. It must, therefore, be pre-
sumed that it would have ·been to the disadvantage of 
their claims had they done so. The appellants had every 
opportunity to make money on their venture, and may 
very well have made money so far as the record is con-
cerned. 
POINTS OF ISSUE 
From the pleadings it is apparent that there are but 
two main points of issue to be considered on this appeal: 
Point 1: Whether or not appellants were induced by 
the alleged fraud and misrepresentations of 
respondents into purchasing the premises 
11 
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in question. 
Point 2: Whether or not appellants are entitled to 
recover anything whatever fom the respon-
dents on their theory of unjust enrich-
ment. 
LAW 
Point 1: Whether or not appellants were induced by 
the alleged fraud and misrepresentations of 
respondents into purchasing the premises 
in question. 
In view of the facts in this case, it is apparent that 
appellants contentions on their allegations of fraud are 
contrary to the holdings of this Court. In the case of 
Peck vs. Judd, 7 Utah 2d 420, 326 Pac. 2d 712, the Court 
said in part, on page 714 of the Pacific citation: 
"It should be observed that as to the premises 
being unfit for habitation as rental units, the 
defendant, upon discovery of such conditions, 
failed to offer to deliver up the premises and 
demand the down payment. If defendant intend-
ed to rely upon fraud as alleged, such action would 
have been essential." 
To the same effect are Frailey vs. McGarry, 116 
Utah 504, 211 Pac. 2d 840; and Taylor vs. Moore, 87 
Utah 493, 51 Pac. 2d 222; McKeller Real Estate and 
Investment Co., vs. Paxton, 62 Utah 97, 218 Pac. 128; 
and LeVine vs. Whitehouse, 37 Utah 260, 109 Pac. 2, 
Annotated Cases 1912-C page 407. 
In the case at bar, appellants not only held the pro-
perty for 33 months after discovering the alleged fraud, 
but never did elect to rescind. The claim of fraud is an 
after-thought. 
Point 2: Whether or not appellants are entitled to 
recover anything whatever from respond-
ents on their theory of unjust enrichment. 
12 
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We are not unmindful of the rule laid down origin-
ally in the case of Malmberg vs. Baugh, 62 Utah 331, 218 
Pac. 975, or of the subsequent cases which affirmed that 
doctrine. But our examination of the Utah cases has 
failed to disclose any case where the Malmberg doctrine 
has been applied to facts like those here on this appeal. 
Basicly, the theory of the Malmberg case, as we under-
stand it, applies to a situation between an original vendor 
and an original vendee, where the vendee through some 
misfortune perhaps has defaulted, and is allowed to re-
cover the excess of his payments over the vendor's dam-
ages. 
That is not the case here. In our case we have the 
situation of vendees <husband and wife) engaging in a 
commercial or business transaction for the expressed 
purpose of "earning a little extra money." (Dep. p. 68). 
Appellant Vern C. Strand was gainfully employed at 
Hill Field at the time of the purchase. Appellant Mrs. 
Strand had previously worked during the marriage, 
operating a beauty shop of her own, and thereafter had 
worked at the Ogden Arsenal ( Dep. p. 9), and at the 
time of Mr. Strand's deposition (July 23, 1958) Mrs. 
Strand was operating the cafe owned by Appellants in 
Nephi, Utah <Dep. p. 10). They did not move onto the 
premises to live, but operated it as a commercial or 
business venture through a hired manager (Dep. p. 37). 
Appellants were shrewd enough · to make "some 
repairs" and put "knotty pine on the front, put a false 
front on it." <Dep. p. 59). And were business-like enough 
to find buyers <Wattersons) and try to sell them the 
place for $75,000.00. Failing to get that nice round fig-
ure, they took W attersons' offer of $63,000.00, thereby 
earning themselves a comfortable profit of $21,500.00, 
more than half again what they had paid for it, of which 
they received an acknowledged $13,1_62.00 in money and 
property for a down payment. Now no one would he 
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naive enough to think for a moment that if the W atter-
sons had remained on the premises and paid out their 
contract the appellants would have divided their profit 
with the respondents. That just isn't done in the business 
world. Nor, in the business world, does an entrepreneur 
ordinarily expect to be so highly favored by the law that 
he can purchase property, put a false front on it, sell it 
for more than SO% more than he paid for it, and then, 
if market conditions change, or bad luck ensues, or the 
new purchaser defaults, or he misjudges his abilities as 
a manager, or neglects his business, fall back upon his 
vendor with a claim for losses. We think this Court never 
intended the Malmberg doctrine to go that far. And yet 
that is what appellants are asking the Court to do on 
this appeal. 
In this case appellants made several bad decisions. 
They got competent advice from a successful Motel 
operator but acted contrary to that advice <Dep. pp. 13, 
24, 35) ; decided they didn't need a builder to advise 
them on the construction of the building (Dep. pp. 18, 
64) ; and "would have been a lot better off" if they had 
never sold to Wattersons at all. <Dep. p. 31). Had ap-
pellants not sold to W attersons they "could have made 
their payments" and "could have paid the property out" 
and would likely be in possession of the property to this 
day. To make matters worse for appellants, they. got 
tired of the responsibility of the Motel. Appellant Strand 
said, in speaking of his negotiations with W attersons: 
"but when they made that offer and I was killing myself 
going out there and back every dog-goned night and my 
wife was hollering about it, I took this offer." (Dep. p. 
33). Later in his deposition he added: "I would have got 
rid of one more headache, the trouble of going out there 
every night." <Dep. p. 34). In other words appellants 
got tired; the Motel was too much trouble; it was a 
headache; they wanted out. And after they got out, even 
though appellant Strand's training and experience was 
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in the field of accounting, auditing and record keeping 
(Dep. pp. 3, 5, 6, 7) he neglected to follow Wattersons, 
Goldsbys, Clinger, Verda Lynn (Lind) or Lucy Semora 
to see that the rental income came to him in the form of 
payments. Illustrative of appellant Strand's weakening 
attitude was his statement about going after Clinger to 
get him to make the payments due him. l--Ie said of 
Clinger: "He told me he couldn't pay me anything and I 
started going out to the car and my wife came in and she 
said by-golly she just had to have that money so then he 
wrote out a check for $500.00 for the payment on the 
place." <Dep. pp. 45, 46). And again, relative to the 
same incident appellant Strand was asked whether or 
not his wife \vere with him when he went after the 
Goldsbys and Mr. Clinger and Verda Lind (Lynn). He 
answered: "No, the ·only time she was with me is when 
I went up to Clingers to collect money and he didn't 
have it for me and she was there and squeezed it out of 
him. She went in and said, 'you had better get some 
money, we can't go on without money.' She bawled me 
out in front of him ... She was out in the car and when 
I went out she wanted to know what was holding me 
up so long and I told her I couldn't get any money and 
she jumped all over me and him too, and he went and 
wrote this check". <For the $500.00). <Dep. p. 69). Then 
appellant Strand volunteered another significant state-
ment. He said: "Yes,· she is blaming me for all of this.'' 
<Dep. p. 69). And well she might. Her husband had 
weakened on the Motel deal; he had gotten tired. He 
should have taken his wife with him more often, and 
should have gone more often himself to collect his pay-
ments, to "see that the rental income got into his hands_. 
Again, appellant Strand's attitude is apparent from the 
following: 
Q. Then referring to January 8, 1958, the day 
when the escrow holder turned the papers 
back to Mr. Mayne, ho"\v many tenants \vere 
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in the Motel? 
A. I don't know. I wasn't operating it. 
Q. Did you check at all to see how many tenants 
were in there? 
A. No. That was Mr. Clinger's place at that time. 
Q. You hadn't operated it since the 20th of March, 
1957, when you sold to Wattersons. 
A. Yes, it changed hands there and changed hands 
and I was just the guy out here on the limb 
that wasn't getting any money and was being 
threatened, hurry and make these payments 
and robbing my family of money to make 
the payments when I didn't get them from those 
people. 
Q. You don't know what the tenancy situation 
was then? 
A. No. <Dep. p. 58). 
He set up no system for checking on the rental 
income from W attersons or any of the other operators 
of the Motel; made no arrangements to insist on collect-
ing it himself for his own protection. He just let the 
matter drift, hoping for his payments, complaining be-
cause he did not get them. Evidently it was too much 
trouble for him. 
Interestingly enough, he had his worst difficulties 
before he sold to Wattersons. It was during that time 
that the soldiers all moved out, the 451st group, "leaving 
the units empty so to speak." (Dep. pp. 40, 60). It took 
him about two months to get the tenancy back up to 
normal. ( Dep. p. 61 ) . Like\vise, it was before he sold to 
Wattersons that he had "some bad luck" with his ten-
ants and couldn't collect from them, gave some of them 
"sheriff's notice and everything, and I couldn't get them 
16 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
out." <Dep. p. 61). Yet with all this trouble he managed to 
keep up his payments and was, with one exception, up 
to date with his payments until he sold to W attersons. 
It \Vas when he let down, got too tired to go out there 
and back every night, and neglected to follow up with 
the successive owners and operators to see where the rents 
went, that the business went from bad to worse, and, 
without the rental income, he couldn't meet his pay-
ments to respondents. 
Now, whose fault was this? Certainly it was not 
respondents'. Appellants must accept full responsibility 
for their failure. 
It would seem apparent that this case falls squarely 
within the rule of Peck vs. Judd, supra, where this Court 
said in part: 
"We fail to see where the defendants have any 
ground to complain unless it be in having over-
estimated the value of the property or in over-
estimating their ability as operators. * * * 
"It is not our prerogative to step in and renego-
tiate the contract of the parties. * * * There is no 
reason why we should consider the vendee privi-
ledged and entitled to our intervention unless the 
conditions sought to be imposed on the vendee 
are unconscionable." 
and equally within the rule stated by Chief Justice Mc-
Donough in Cole vs. Parker, 5 Utah 2d 263, 300 Pac. 2d. 
623, quoted in Peck vs. Judd, when he said: 
" ... In the absence of fraud or imposition the 
parties are bound by the price or measure of value 
they have agreed on, and such price must be paid 
notwithstanding it may be excessive. The courts 
cannot supervise decisions made in the business 
world and grant relief when the bargain proves 
improvident." 
17 
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ARGUMENT 
From appellants' admission, there was no increase 
in the rental value of the motel and premises involved 
in this suit even though appellants allegedly spent $9,-
567.37 in repairing and improving the premises. To 
award appellants judgment for moneys spent for im-
provements and repairs which did not increase the rent-
al value or rental income of the property would be un-
justly enriching the appellants by requiring respondents 
to reimburse them for a bad or unwise investment. 
Appellants' contention is that the property was 
worth $35,000.00 when they bought it. Using the in-
come approach to ascertain the value of the property, 
then by appellants' admission that vvhatever improve-
ments they may have added did not increase the rental 
value or rental income, the property is still worth only 
$35,000.00. Certainly the value of the property could not 
have doubled while the income remained the same. Any 
decision to make a vendor in an arms-length transaction 
reimburse a vendee for money expended on repairs or 
so-called improvements which do not produce any addi-
tional income, would be most unconscionable. 
When appellants sold to W attersons they elected to 
take their chances on a ne\v transaction which then 
offered them a substantial profit, and in so doing elected 
to cut themselves off from all recourse against their ven-
dors (respondents herein) and from a possible claim for 
unjust enrichment. By selling the property at a profit of 
$21,500.00, appellants have a cause of action against 
their vendees for loss of an advantageous bargain. To give 
them also a cause of action against respondents for un-
just enrichment would seem neither reasonable nor real-
istic, but wholly unconscionable. Thus, if appellants were 
to succeed in this cause, where \vould appellants and res-
pondents stand in relation to the appellants' transferees: 
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Wattersons, Goldsbys, Clinger, Verda Lind (Lynn) and 
Lucy Semora? If the appellants can be said to have a 
cause of action against respondents for unjust enrich-
ment in addition to a cause of action against W attersons 
for loss of an advantageous bargain, where is the Court 
going to stop in its effort to be pa temalistic towards these 
appellants as vendees? 
As indicated, appellants sold to the W attersons for 
a profit of $21 ,500.00; and theW attersons thereafter sold 
to Goldsbys and Clinger for some undisclosed advantage 
or profit. Then Goldsbys and Clinger evidently sold to . 
Verda Lind (Lynn) and Lucy Semora for some undis-
closed advantage or profit. Where, as here, a vendee (ap-
pellants) sells for a substantial profit and upon default 
of his transferee would have a right of action for loss of 
an advantageous bargain against that transferee, justice 
would seem to dictate that, if anyone, the last vendee 
should be the only one permitted a right of action 
against the original vendor. To hold otherwise, the Court 
would be going beyond the bounds of reason to over-
protect a party to a contract who has made a bad bargain. 
Certainly the decisions of this Court, as we read them, 
do not give evidence of favoring any such a paternalistic 
attitude. In the instant case, the last vendee, Verda Lynn 
(Lind), has had her day in court, and the matter is res 
adjudicata. · 
Appellants are unable or unwilling to account for 
the operational income while others were in con-
trol of the motel and premises, and, in fact, unable or 
unwilling to account for their own operational income. 
In Peck vs. Judd, supra, the Court put some emphasis on 
the fact that the vendee in that case received $51,741.49 
as rentals, and paid $36,767.56 to the vendors. In the pre;. 
cent case the appellants, being unable or unwilling to 
account for moneys that changed hands in subsequent 
sales and in being unable or unwilling to account for 
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rents received from operations of the motel and premis-
es during the time they and their transferees were in pos-
session, should not be heard to complain that there has 
been unjust enrichment when they themselves cannot or 
will not account for moneys they and their successors 
have received in operation of the property. They should 
be estopped in equity from claiming unjust enrichment 
where such an accounting cannot be or is not made by 
them. To hold otherwise would encourage parties to 
such a contract to destroy their records or fail to keep 
them, in order that they might one day sue for unjust 
enrichment and not have to account for the money rec-
eived from such an operation. Thus by appellants' own 
dereliction they have not only made it "impractical or 
extremely difficult" to fix any actual damage one way 
or the other, they have made it impossible. Without that 
accounting the Court cannot possibly make any mathe-
matical calculation which might otherwise aid it in arriv-
ing at a conclusion with reference to the true facts. Hav-
ing failed to account or specify in an affidavit their rea-
sons for not accounting, the ruling of this Court in Dupler 
vs. Yates, 10 U. 2d 251, 351 Pac. 2d 624, would seem 
to be applicable. At page 637 of the Pacific volume this 
Court said: 
"Upon a motion for summary judgment, the 
courts ought to recognize as a minimum, that the 
opposing party produce some evidentiary matter 
in contradiction of the movant's case or specify in 
an affidavit the reason why he cannot do so." 
See also Pender vs. Alix, 11 U. 2d 58, 354 Pac. 2d 
1066. . 
If appellants' position in this case were to be upheld 
or declared valid, then all pending escrow contracts are 
insecure, and all persons holding any interest in any 
escrow agreement, whether as the original vendor o,r. as 
the purchaser or successive purchaser of the vendors In-
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terest, would be either buying a Ia,vsuit or be under the 
constant threat of a lawsuit while the original vendee 
and his transferees tested the market for a profit or a suc-
cession of profits until the escrow was paid out. A pan-
dora's box of legal troubles would engulf the field of 
escrow contracts. 
It seems absurd to us to think that purchasers could 
buy real property under contract for $41,500.00, and then 
sell it for $63,000.00 for a profit of more than 50% of the 
original cost, and be able, ·if their sale matured· as expec-
ted, to keep their profits; but, if their $63,000.00 sale did 
not mature properly, be a·ble to fall back on their vendors 
and claim a refund to minimize any possible loss. This 
would be a "heads I win and tails you lose" 'proposition. 
I_t is wholly inconsistent with the law of sales and entirely 
inconsistent with the theory of free enterp~ise and- cap-
italism generally. When one takes anq assumes a risk 
in business he takes the profits or t4e losses as they oc-
cur, and as his foresight and husines~ acumen dictate. 
Otherwise, one could gamble \vith the property of an-
other, profiting if successful and returning the property 
if unsuccessful. 
There is another insidious side-light to such a pro-
position. It would permit reckless or un,wise or impru-
dent individuals to take the property of their conservative 
vendor and expend unwise sums on repairs or so-called 
improvements, and then demand all or a substantial part 
of his rash expenditures back if his improvements added 
nothing to the income of the property. This is exactly 
what has happened in the case at hand. The real value 
of the property here lies in the rand, not the buildings. 
Of what value were or are the so-called improvements to 
the respondents \vhen appellants admit that their al-
leged improvements did not appreciably increase the 
rental income (Appellants' answer 91 to respondents' 
interrogatory 91, R. 50) and when appellants kept the 
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rates "pretty much the same" as they were before. (Dep. 
p. 26). 
Certtainly this is not what this Court contemplated 
in the Malmberg case, supra, or has contemplated in 
cases subsequent to it. Appellants would have this Court 
embark upon a new revolutionary path through the legal 
wilderness by giving approval to a theory which is com-
pletely radical from all previous notions of property 
rights and contracts for the sale of land. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, we submit that appellants have no 
possible claim against the respondents either for fraud 
or for undue enrichment, and that the decision of the 
trial court in granting respondents' motion for summary 
judgment was correct and should be affirmed. 
Dated this 31st day of August, 1962. 
LEWIS J. WALLACE 
ROBERT E. FROERER 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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